A long narrow web of cloth fabric can be lost to view on a desert rock. Such an obstacle may be a life-threatening surprise even in clear weather, in low level flight.
At the beginning of January, a privately owned helicopter in Arizona crashed in a remote canyon when it hit a slackline that was thrown over a mountain range. The investigators of the federal agencies started to look at the manner in which the line was set and marked, the information that was being relayed to the pilots and the way low-altitude hazards are conveyed.
The event is at the crossroads of two outdoor cultures, which occupy the identical dramatic landscape: canyon highlining and scenic rotorcraft flying. What ensues are working lessons to pilots, outdoor recreators or anyone in charge of putting or publishing aerial hazards based on the already verified facts to date.
1. A slackline might serve as a hazard of unknown wire
A slackline is a piece of nylon or polyester webbing that is attached somewhere between two items to balance walk. When placed over a canyon the same equipment becomes a slender, high-tension obstruction across open air–which is visually nearer to a trail characteristic than a trail characteristic.
In the Arizona crash, officials told that there was a recreational slackline, which was above a kilometer long, spread across the mountain range. One eyewitness who relayed his account to the police said that the helicopter seemed to hit some part of the line and then plummeted into the canyon. International Slackline Association reported that no highliners were on the line.
In terms of safety planning, the most important thing is that recreation is not low impact in terms of aviation. The height of slackline provides a cross-canyon hazard, which is hard to notice, underestimated, and in a rotorcraft setting is unforgiving.
2. Volume is important because not all obstacles are traditional, and these obstacles can be warned with the help of NOTAM
In the event of a temporary or unusual hazard to the aviation industry, a Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) may be sent to warn pilots. In the case, federal aviation records indicated that there was a notice of a tight-rope obstruction on the area that was flagged and was lit in a one-nautical-mile radius as well as at approximately 600 feet altitude.
A single aviation instructor, Tim Kiefer of the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Prescott, pointed out that despite a warning being given, they might be missed in practice due to pilots sorting through heavy briefings. Five, six, seven pages of NOTAMs, said Kiefer. Therefore, it is possible to ignore things due to the volume of information that is inputted in that system.
To non-aviation readers, this is translated into a basic fact: despite the presence of hazard information, there is a possibility of it being lost in a number of documents- so clarity, specificity and redundancy should be valued in situations where the barrier is almost invisible.
3. A feeble defence to thin lines is see and avoid
The helicopters are often working at low altitudes to do the work that the fixed-wing aircraft can hardly do, and the issue of safety is not new: the wires and wire-like hazards may hardly be detectable until it is too late.
A guest writer at FAA Safety Briefing has pointed out that wire strikes continue to be the primary cause of fatal accidents in low-level helicopter flights and that the reaction of pilots of all experience levels is similar after being involved in an incident: I just didn’t see it. The article also emphasizes that risks may occur nearly everywhere when operations are below 500 feet above the ground, and the crews cannot rely on visual detection only.
4. Lighting and marking are helpful, but positioning and adherence is important
The International Slackline Association reported that FAA was notified about an aviation-marked slackline and before the crash a NOTAM was submitted. That indicates a significant sub-point: the presence of marking and notification does not necessarily resolve the question whether the setup complied with all the relevant procedures- or whether the hazard was so much conspicuous as to the circumstances and flight profile.
This difference was also emphasized by Kiefer in remarks reported by the local media that a notice does not necessarily imply any blame on a pilot and that the individuals who installed the line may or may not have conformed to a process necessary in that place and height. A lot of things are in play here, said he.
5. Risk management at low level is through communication of the crews and not through individual vigilance
Guidelines on rotorcraft safety are increasingly viewing the detection of hazards as a group process. The FAA safety guide on wire hazards is that the briefing of everyone on board and crew resource management should be encouraged in such a way that passengers and crew members raise voices when they see towers, lines, and any other impediments.
Such a strategy is important outside utility and emergency work. The flights of scenic, ferry, and the personal trips can still penetrate in the terrain-following altitudes; more so in rugged landscapes. During such moments, the second-eyes and the clear-cut call-out expectations emerge as a significant source of protection, especially when it comes to such dangers that are not represented by standard infrastructural features.
6. Outdoor recreation and aviation are using the same airspace, usually without awareness
Highlining has become popular particularly in canyon areas that also draw helicopters to undertake tourism, training and personal travel as well as special service. The intersection might be unintended on either side: highliners might be inclined to think in cliffs and anchor-points, pilots to think in routes and terrain and every feature that they expect to be marked on the map or made obvious.
The crash in Arizona demonstrates the speed with which that intersection can become consequential. The helicopter in question happened to be an MD 369FF, and the takeoff point was at Pegasus Airpark in Queen Creek, as the local authorities pointed out. Relatives identified the four family members who were on board.
The safety lesson where shared use cannot be avoided is operational, instead of physical: increased coordination and better description of hazards, as well as not changing the process of temporary aerial obstructions to make the recreation of one group into the unseen emergency of another group.
The federal investigators are still looking into the crash, including the contribution of the slackline and the information available to the pilot. The enduring topicality is not confined to one canyon: as the outdoor sport expands and low-altitude flight continues to play an indispensable role in most places, the only obstacles to the eyes and the efficiency of aviation signals will be thin and short-lived.
